

**B. The Post-Symposium Meeting**

1. The meeting, chaired by the undersigned, was convened at Project White Stork headquarters in Columbus and included representatives from ATIC (AFOIN 4E4), Project White Stork, USN Hydrographic Office, Aeronautical Chart and Information Center, and the Air Force Cambridge Research Center.

2. Against the backdrop of a Symposium plea for more of the data needed for an unclassified (USAF-financed) World Gravity Program, the meeting was opened by the undersigned with a brief intelligence summary of Soviet progress and achievements in geodesy and, more particularly, in gravimetry. Some evidence was presented to illustrate the scheming on the part of the Soviet Union to increase international gravity surveys during the IGY while carefully avoiding any similar increase in Soviet domestic activity. Moreover, the recent explicit Soviet refusal to declassify and disseminate gravity data was not only in marked contrast with the traditional Western policy of sharing such data, but it also underscored the Soviet intention of maintaining the

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inequity resulting from Soviet intransigence. Since gravity surveys may be stimulated by the IGY, it was necessary to explore the problems of (1) whether US gravity data are to be freely disseminated and (2) what complications might arise from a US violation of the spirit of free exchange of IGY data in the event of a US refusal to release gravity data.

3. The discussion revealed a strong common concern to forestall an indiscriminate dissemination of gravimetric data. The following conclusions evolved as the consensus of the group.

a. Gravity data must be considered as having military value.

b. Gravity and geodetic data over broad areas can be secured only through costly, time-consuming surveys in the field. In this aspect, field data in general differ from data secured by laboratory research; they are not subject to concurrent duplication. The withholding of field data is an effective means of denying advantages to unfriendly countries.

c. The US government, which finances most gravity surveys, must consider carefully what data might be released and what data could be obtained in exchange.

d. The IGY program includes two types of gravity data that must be shared: (1) time-recorded observations for earth-tide studies, and (2) such gravity data for the Antarctic as are required in the glaciology studies for determining the thickness of the ice. The former have no military significance. The latter, however, should either be incorporated into finished glaciology studies that would not mean divulging of the actual gravity values, or they should be presented as raw data in uncorrected form (i.e. gravity observations without elevations).

e. Although the group agreed that US gravity survey data should not be included in the exchange of IGY data, this posed a dilemma for the Air Force gravity project at the Ohio State University, which depends upon contributions of data from all parts of the world. Because of this situation, OSU is obligated to make its results openly available to all contributors of data. (The Air Force Cambridge Research Center asked for guidance in resolving the dilemma. The solution of this difficult problem will require special consideration in a series of future meetings).

f. The Air Force representative sought guidance again on how Woollard's data might be screened to make them useless to the USSR for geodetic purposes. The Air Force will also keep the group advised of Woollard's plans for a trip to the Soviet Union so that it can provide collection guidance. This phase of activity will require additional future discussions by the group.

g. The indiscriminate sharing of all results and data of the US Naval Observatory project on lunar photography may make possible a geodetic bridging of continents that would be unwise from the standpoint of US defense considerations. Therefore, efforts should be made to limit the dissemination to (1) raw lunar photographs or (2) to summaries giving only the end results on the variations in the rotation of the earth.

h. The group concluded that the geodetic data obtained by the Army Map Service in its completion of the 30th meridian arc in Africa was of military importance. Efforts should be made to protect the observational data from falling into Soviet hands, but this may not be easy since certain data have already been given to the countries in which the field work was undertaken.

i. The group concurred in US Navy plans not to release any submarine gravity data.

j. Attempts should be made to establish a cutoff date after which geodetic data on the US artificial earth satellite would cease to be considered a part of the IGY program and, therefore, will not be subject to public release.

k. In view of the complexity of the problems reviewed by the group, which could not possibly be resolved in one meeting, it was agreed that future meetings would be required. Moreover, it was agreed that efforts should be made to formalize future group meetings, possibly by creating a working group under the Guided Missiles Intelligence Committee of the IAC.

### III. Recommendations

It is recommended that the group be given authorization to (1) initiate additional informal meetings to follow through on the outstanding problems, and (2) explore the possibilities of formalizing a working group under the GMIC.

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